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Banning Bribes Abroad: US
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act
ELLEN GUTTERMAN*
The United States has been at the forefront of international efforts to combat corruption in
the global economy for almost forty years, chiefly through its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
[FCPA]. Over the past decade, US enforcement of the FCPA has surged in terms of both the
number of enforcement actions and the application of increasingly expansive interpretations
of jurisdiction through which to enforce the FCPA on an extraterritorial basis. Extraterritorial
enforcement of the FCPA has promoted anti-corruption policies and the banning of bribes
abroad, but three aspects of FCPA enforcement shape and constrain the broader goals
of global anti-corruption governance in ways that limit effective governance practices
and meaningful anti-corruption reform in the global economy: the narrow conception of
corruption upon which the FCPA is based, the strategic trade frame that underlies the FCPA’s
internationalization, and the legitimacy problems these suggest.
Les États-Unis sont depuis près de quarante ans à l’avant-scène de l’offensive internationale
contre la corruption dans l’économie mondiale, principalement grâce à sa Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act [FCPA]. Depuis une décennie, la mise en application par les États-Unis de la
FCPA a nettement augmenté tant pour ce qui est du nombre des mesures coercitives que
dans l’adoption de critères d’interprétation de plus en plus souples pour la compétence
juridictionnelle permettant d’appliquer la FCPA de manière extraterritoriale. L’application
extraterritoriale de la FCPA a favorisé les politiques anticorruption et l’interdiction des
pots-de-vin à l’étranger, mais trois aspects de l’application de la FCPA modèlent et encadrent
les objectifs plus larges de la gouvernance mondiale anticorruption d’une manière qui limite
l’efficacité des pratiques de gouvernance et une réforme anticorruption significative de
l’économie mondiale : la conception étriquEE de la corruption sur laquelle est fondEE la
FCPA, le cadre commercial stratégique qui sous-tend la mondialisation de la FCPA et les
problèmes de légitimité qu’ils suggèrent.

*

Associate Professor of Political Science, Glendon College, York University. An earlier version
of this article was presented at the Second OHLJ Symposium, Understanding and Taming
Public and Private Corruption in the 21st Century, 6-7 November 2014, Osgoode Hall Law
School, Toronto.
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NOTWITHSTANDING ITS SUPPORT OF a variety of corrupt and kleptocratic

authoritarian regimes throughout the Cold War, the United States has been
at the forefront of international efforts to combat corruption in the global
economy for almost forty years. Its chief legal instrument throughout has been
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [FCPA].1 Enacted in 1977 and twice amended
in 1988 and again in 1998, the FCPA prohibits corrupt payments by individuals
and companies to foreign government officials for the purpose of “securing
any improper advantage” in obtaining or retaining business abroad.2 Jointly
enforced by the criminal division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and
the enforcement division of the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”),
the FCPA applies to any US person (individual or entity) as well as to any
non-US persons with securities registered in the US (“non-US issuers”) and the
employees of such persons engaged in proscribed acts outside the territory of the

1.
2.

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, 15 USC §§ 78dd-1, et seq (1977) [FCPA].
USA, Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice and the Enforcement Division
of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, FCPA: A resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (Washington, DC, 2012) at 92.
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United States. In short, the FCPA bans bribery abroad by US persons and some
non-US persons alike.
Over the past decade, enforcement of this ban by the United States has surged.
FCPA enforcement has yielded record fines and disgorgements of profits totalling
more than $5 billion USD,3 exacted prison sentences up to fifteen years for
individuals, and created far-reaching consequences for anti-bribery enforcement
in other jurisdictions. As FCPA enforcement has grown, so has the corpus of
media analysis and legal scholarship—particularly from international business
lawyers—devoted to examining, explaining, and commenting on this legislation
and its impact on business.4 Not surprisingly, most of the FCPA literature
expresses considerable consternation among business-oriented observers that the
enforcement agencies have become “overzealous” in their focus on the FCPA,
which has sharply increased the risks and altered the calculus of international
commercial ventures.5
Taking a close look at the data on FCPA enforcement actions since 2003,
the present study reveals two notable trends.6 The first is the trend of increased
3.
4.

5.

6.

Unless otherwise noted, all monetary values discussed in this article are in US dollars (USD).
Eric C Chaffee, “From Legalized Business Ethics to International Trade Regulation: The Role
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other Transnational Anti-Bribery Regulations in
Fighting Corruption in International Trade” (2013) 65:3 Mercer L Rev 701; Sarah Bartle,
Chris Chamberlain & Brian Wohlberg, “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (2014) 51:4 Am
Crim L Rev 1265; John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, “The Recent and Unusual Evolution of
an Expanding FCPA” (2012) 26:1 Notre Dame JL Ethics & Pub Pol’y 25; Stuart H Deming,
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the New International Norms, 2d ed (Chicago: American
Bar Association, 2010); Daniel Patrick Ashe, “The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the
United States: The Recent Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act” (2005) 73:6 Fordham L Rev 2897.
Kristin Isaacson, “Minimizing the Menace of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act”
(2014) U Ill L Rev 597; Mike Koehler, “Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Enters a New Era” (2011) 43:1 U Tol L Rev 99; Jordan Weissmann, “The
Corruption Law That Scares the Bejesus Out of Corporate America,” The Atlantic
(25 April 2012), online: <http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/04/
the-corruption-law-that-scares-the-bejesus-out-of-corporate-america/256314/#>.
Enforcement data throughout are drawn from Shearman & Sterling LLP’s “FCPA Digest of
Cases.” See Philip Urofsky et al, eds, FCPA Digest: Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes
to Foreign Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (New York: Shearman
& Sterling LLP, 2014), online: <www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Services/FCPA/2014/
January_2014_FCPA_DigestFCPA010614.pdf> [Shearman & Sterling Report]. Further
information is drawn from the websites of the DOJ and SEC. See also US Department of
Justice, “FCPA: Related Enforcement Actions” (2014), online: <www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/a.html>; US Securities & Exchange Commission, “SEC Enforcement
Actions: FCPA Cases” (2014), online: <www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml>.
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enforcement. As others have noted, there have been significantly more enforcement
actions against both corporations and individuals in the past decade than ever
before, and they have yielded greater penalties. Expanded enforcement has
involved unprecedented reliance on deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements to exact penalties and ensure the implementation of robust corporate
compliance regimes among those suspected of foreign bribery. The impact of
these so-called diversion agreements on FCPA enforcement is, among other
ramifications, such that the trend of expanded enforcement is likely to continue.
The second notable trend is the application of increasingly expansive notions
of jurisdiction in the enforcement of the FCPA. Over the past decade, US
agencies have increasingly enforced the FCPA against foreign issuers and foreign
nationals for behaviour undertaken outside the territory of the United States. In
tandem with the use of diversion agreements, which replace costly trials but also
preclude the production of judicial decisions and the development of case law on
such matters, the enforcement agencies have expanded the theories of jurisdiction
upon which they base their claims of authority over bribery abroad. Interestingly,
they have been doing so in ways that run counter to trends in other areas of law in
which US courts have been limiting the extraterritorial application of American
law. Extraterritorial jurisdiction extends the scope and reach of national laws
into global regulatory environments and into other sovereign territories. Long a
scholarly focus within specific fields in international trade and economic law, such
as anti-trust, export control, and securities regulation, extraterritorial jurisdiction
is increasingly the subject of attention and controversy in international legal
scholarship concerning human rights, transnational crime, and other issues.7 This
literature has yet to grapple with extraterritoriality in anti-corruption law, which
is quickly becoming a defining feature of the global governance of corruption.
The twin trends of expanded FCPA enforcement and expanded jurisdiction
in FCPA enforcement are important not just for practitioners and commercial
enterprises seeking to avoid running afoul of the law. Such active extraterritorial
enforcement of the FCPA also carries important implications in the global
governance of corruption generally. It exemplifies the ways in which American
legal frameworks, politics, and public policy are being actively exported by
7.

See e.g. Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008); Mark Gibney, “Toward a Theory of Extraterritoriality” (2010) 95 Mil L Rev
Headnotes 81; Paul Arnell, Law Across Borders: The Extraterritorial Application of United
Kingdom Law (New York: Routledge, 2012); Kal Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow
the Flag?: The Evolution of Territoriality in American Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009); Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011).
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US enforcement authorities, thereby shaping and constraining global politics
in both intended and unintended ways. Beyond legal questions concerning
the proper scope of jurisdiction, these practices raise important questions
concerning expressions of power in global politics and the theory and practice of
international relations. Under what circumstances are states more or less likely to
apply and enforce law across borders? What explains the scope and limitations
of extraterritorial jurisdiction in various areas of international law, in theory
and in practice? What are the implications of extraterritorial jurisdiction for
state sovereignty and autonomy, and for the efficacy and legitimacy of global
regimes of governance in a range of issue areas? In the case of US enforcement
of the FCPA, increasingly expansive notions of jurisdiction promote US foreign
policy and domestic political and economic objectives, and serve to shape the
global regime of anti-corruption in light of those objectives. In crucial ways, the
underlying resource in FCPA enforcement is hegemonic American power, which
ultimately challenges norms of sovereignty, legitimacy, justice, cooperation,
national interests, as well as efficacy in global governance.
This article draws out and explains these themes in three main parts. Part
I provides the background and global context of US enforcement of the FCPA,
moving beyond the US regulatory environment of the FCPA to highlight the global
governance of bribery and corruption and, particularly, the internationalization
of the FCPA in the 1990s via the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (“OECD”). Part II draws on data from a variety of governmental,
intergovernmental, non-governmental, and private sector sources to demonstrate
and discuss the two key trends in FCPA enforcement over the past decade,
namely the expansion of enforcement—including the expanded use of diversion
agreements—and the expansion of jurisdiction, including recent illustrative cases.
Part III discusses the implications of these trends along two dimensions. The first,
citing research in political science and international relations, shows how US
enforcement of the FCPA has been instrumental in promoting anti-corruption
policies and enforcing anti-corruption legislation globally, and in banning
bribes abroad. At the same time, the application of the FCPA to persons and
circumstances outside the territory of the United States shapes and constrains
international anti-corruption efforts in ways that may be unintended but that
may nevertheless run counter to effective governance practices and meaningful
anti-corruption reform in the global economy. Three aspects of FCPA enforcement
in particular constrain the broader goals of global anti-corruption governance:
the narrow conception of corruption upon which the FCPA is based, the strategic
trade frame which underlies the FCPA’s internationalization, and the legitimacy
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problems these suggest. Building on established interdisciplinary International
Law/International Relations (“IL/IR”) scholarship, the article concludes with
suggestions for such interdisciplinary work on the global governance of bribery
and corruption, and calls for a new IL/IR agenda of research on extraterritorial
jurisdiction in international law, generally.

I. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT: THE GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION REGIME
A. THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION

Corruption emerged as a primary item on the global governance agenda,
as well as on the agenda of US foreign policy, beginning in the mid-1990s.8
Most contemporary research on corruption—most simply defined as the
abuse of public power for private gain, but involving complex patterns and
wide-ranging manifestations—reveals that corruption is a harmful problem
that causes damaging outcomes across a range of concerns in the international
political economy, making its control an important focus of international policy.
Corruption distorts markets, disrupts international flows of goods and capital,
and reduces economic growth. Some estimates show that the cost of corruption
amounts to more than five per cent of global GDP ($2.6 trillion) with more than
$1 trillion paid in bribes each year.9 In international business, bribery impedes fair
market competition and obstructs liberal international trade. By paying bribes,
corrupt firms gain an unfair business advantage against more efficient firms and
raise the cost of doing business for all. The cost of bribes can escalate, and the
advantages gained become increasingly unreliable. Insofar as corruption includes
the “capture” of public institutions and regulatory bodies by powerful private

8.
9.

This section draws upon Ellen Gutterman, “Corruption in the Global Economy” in Greg
Anderson & Christopher J Kukucha, eds, International Political Economy (Don Mills, ON:
Oxford University Press Canada, 2016) 456.
See e.g. World Economic Forum, “Global Agenda Council on Anti-Corruption &
Transparency 2012–2014,” Global Agenda Council on Anti-Corruption & Transparency
2013 World Economic Forum, online: <www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC/2013/Connect/
WEF_GAC_Anticorruption_Transparency_2012-2014_Connect.pdf>; The World Bank,
“The Costs of Corruption,” (8 April 2004), online: <go.worldbank.org/48TXKPO9U0>.
For a skeptical view, see Chris Blattman, “Corruption and Development: Not
What You Think?” (5 November 2012), online: <chrisblattman.com/2012/11/05/
corruption-and-development-not-what-you-think>.
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interests, it has been identified by some commentators as the key underlying
cause of the 2007–2008 global financial crisis.10
Corruption also impedes sustainable development and perpetuates poverty.
Resources intended to assist development and alleviate global poverty are often
diverted through corruption and aid does not reach its intended recipients.
Corruption can lead to indiscriminate lending for development projects that
fill the pockets of bureaucrats rather than the stomachs of the hungry. In The
White Man’s Burden, William Easterly notes that trillions of dollars of foreign
aid spent on grandiose development projects since the 1960s have been wasted
and billions outright stolen due to corruption, causing costs to democracy,
human rights, global health, and the environment.11 Corruption also degrades
the quality of goods and services provided, with sometimes catastrophic social
costs—substandard housing and public health systems, substandard medicine
and health care, dangerous industrial conditions, and vulnerability to natural
disasters. As the anti-corruption NGO Transparency International emphasizes,
the poor and disempowered suffer the most from corruption, which often goes
hand in hand with violence and persistent poverty.12
Corruption undermines democracy, human rights, and human security. It
feeds political instability, sustains inequality, undermines public trust in society’s
institutions of governance, leads to social unrest, and supports the proliferation
of transnational crime. Corrupt and criminal organizations can supplant
government authority, creating a new type of violent and authoritarian social
control that is destructive of communities and human rights.13 Corruption
remains an underlying feature of ongoing drug wars in Mexico, the 2012 Arab
Spring developments and continuing political instability in the Middle East, and
international terrorism. For all these reasons, corruption in the global economy is
an important concern of foreign policy and for international regulation.

10. Daniel Kaufmann, “Corruption and the Global Financial Crisis,” Forbes (27 January
2009), online: <www.forbes.com/2009/01/27/corruption-financial-crisis-businesscorruption09_0127corruption.html>.
11. William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So
Much Ill and So Little Good (London: Penguin Books, 2007).
12. Transparency International, “About Transparency International” (2015), online: <www.
transparency.org/about>.
13. Louise I Shelley, “Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism” in H Richard
Friman & Peter Andreas, eds, The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Lanham, Md:
Rowman & Littlefield, 1999) 25 [Shelley, “Transnational Organized Crime”].
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B. TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FCPA

While the bribery of domestic public officials has long been outlawed in the
developed world, the payment of bribes to foreign officials in the pursuit of
international business has not. Until the late 1990s, official state support for
bribery in international business was a standard practice in many OECD
countries, roughly half of which (including Australia, Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Holland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland) actively
condoned and endorsed such payments by permitting them as tax-deductible
business expenses.14 While other states did not render bribes tax-deductible,
only a few of them explicitly prohibited the practice and only the United States,
starting in 1977, prohibited such bribes as a criminal offense. Not only did
several OECD states publicly defend and legitimate the practice of transnational
bribery, but also Germany, France, and others firmly opposed any multilateral
effort to change this approach.15 Officials from these states argued that the bribery
of public officials was a normal business practice in many countries—particularly
less developed countries—and was therefore an acceptable practice for Western
businesses engaged in commerce abroad.16
In contrast to this global context of legitimate, state-supported transnational
bribery, the 1977 FCPA outlawed the bribery of foreign public officials in
international business transactions through two sets of provisions. First, criminal
law provisions under the jurisdiction of the DOJ made it a criminal offense for any
US person (individual or corporation) to make payments to foreign government
officials to assist in retaining or obtaining business. Second, accounting and
reporting provisions of the FCPA under the jurisdiction of the SEC introduced
record-keeping rules designed to expose such unlawful payments. Criminal
penalties under the FCPA included fines of up to $2 million for firms, and up to
$100,000 and five years imprisonment for individuals.
This unilateral constraint on US businesses arose as a result of
Watergate-related revelations about foreign corrupt practices undertaken by
major US corporations, the ethical resonance of which led legislators to enact the
FCPA, regardless of countervailing strategic trade considerations and regardless
14. Martine Milliet-Einbinder, “Writing Off Tax Deductibility,” OECD Observer (April 2000)
online: <www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/245>.
15. Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A Lacey & Jutta Birmele, “The 1998 OECD
Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in
Business Transactions” (2000) 37 Am Bus LJ 485.
16. John Brademas & Fritz Heiman, “Tackling International Corruption: No Longer Taboo”
(1998) 77 Foreign Aff 5.

GUTTERMAN, BANNING BRIBES ABROAD

39

of opposition by powerful business groups. Subsequent efforts to repeal or amend
the FCPA were impeded by the post-Watergate significance of the deeply held
norm of anti-corruption, which was explicitly articulated in the FCPA.17
From the outset, US corporations and business groups strongly opposed this
constraint on their ability to compete for business abroad against competitors
in France, Germany, the UK, and elsewhere, who remained unconstrained from
paying bribes to win contracts. Nevertheless, a decade of lobbying to repeal the
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions failed to yield the results US businesses wanted: to
be able to legally offer bribes for business in countries where, they argued, corrupt
practices were the accepted norm. Instead, in 1988 Congress amended the FCPA
to clarify and strengthen (rather than repeal) its regulatory requirements and
to require the President to seek to internationalize anti-bribery rules through
negotiations at the OECD.18
C. THE FCPA IN THE 1990S: POLICY INTERNATIONALIZATION AND THE
OECD CONVENTION

As a result of the 1988 amendments, the United States became an international
norm leader on anti-corruption and a crucial player in the emergence of an
international regime to govern corruption in the global economy, the centrepiece
of which was a binding OECD convention to criminalize transnational bribery.
However, notwithstanding the powerful normative context of the FCPA, the
motivation for US leadership on international anti-bribery rules at the OECD
in the 1990s and beyond lay not in normative concerns, but in strategic trade
calculations. Although the United States did not seek a legally-binding treaty
commitment to ban transnational bribery, it agreed to one at the behest of France
and Germany, its partners in the OECD who wanted to be sure that if they
were to repeal their own standard practices of permitting the tax-deductibility of
foreign bribes, the United States would be constrained by a binding commitment
(as opposed to a non-binding hortatory norm) to vigorously enforce its own
anti-bribery measures. As a state-supported strategic trade practice, transnational
bribery presents a prisoner’s dilemma for states and firms competing for
international business. The US-prompted negotiations for anti-bribery rules at
the OECD produced a binding multilateral convention to resolve this prisoner’s
dilemma in the context of free-trade seeking neoliberal globalization. The 1997
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
17. Ellen Gutterman, “Easier Done Than Said: Transnational Bribery, Norm Resonance, and the
Origins of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (2015) 11:1 Foreign Pol’y Analysis 109.
18. Ibid at 117.
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Transactions, together with related recommendations, obligated its signatories
to criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials on an extraterritorial basis,
end the tax-deductibility of those bribes, and cooperate to monitor and enforce
compliance.19 It became the legal centerpiece of a robust international regime of
anti-corruption.
Today, the United States vigorously enforces the FCPA, the OECD
Convention’s signatories have all adopted similar kinds of legislation, and the
Convention parties have conducted three rounds of rigorous peer-review
monitoring to evaluate members’ compliance with and enforcement of the rules.
According to the OECD, since 1997 over 300 individuals and companies have
been sanctioned for foreign bribery under various national laws, and hundreds
more are under investigation.20 In addition, the 2005 United Nations Convention
Against Corruption [UNCAC] has required its 140 signatories to outlaw a wide
range of corrupt activities, including bribery of national and foreign public
officials and officials of public international organizations, embezzlement and
misuse of funds in both the public and private sector, laundering the proceeds
of crime, obstruction of justice, and more. It also spawned the UNCAC Civil
Society Coalition, which unites over 350 civil society organizations from over 100
countries in a global network aimed at promoting the ratification, implementation,
and ongoing monitoring of the UNCAC and other anti-corruption initiatives.21
Most recently, the G20 group of states has formed a standing anti-corruption
working group to promote private sector transparency and integrity, international
cooperation on asset recovery regimes, and the prevention of corruption in the
global extractive, fisheries, forestry, and construction industries.22 Beyond the
FCPA, clearly, the global governance of bribery and corruption is growing.

19. OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Transactions
20. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Working Group
on Bribery Elects New Chair” (7 August 2013), online: OECD <www.oecd.org/daf/
anti-bribery/oecd-working-group-on-bribery-elects-new-chair.htm>.
21. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention Against Corruption,
GA Res 58/4, UNGAOR, 58th Sess (2003); UNCAC Coalition, “About the Coalition”
(2016), online: <www.uncaccoalition.org/en_US/about-us/about-the-coalition>.
22. The Group of Twenty, “First G20 Anti-Corruption Working
Group Meeting held in Istanbul” (2015), online: <https://g20.org/
first-g20-anti-corruption-working-group-meeting-held-in-istanbul/>.
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II. ENFORCEMENT OF THE FCPA IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
DATA AND TRENDS
In the first twenty years of the FCPA’s existence, from 1977–1997, the DOJ and
the SEC pursued a combined total of forty-four enforcement actions against
corporations and individuals found to have violated the FCPA’s anti-bribery
measures—an average of two per year. Nevertheless, US companies complained
bitterly about even this low measure of enforcement and pushed the government
to “level the playing field” for US business, either by repealing the bribery
provisions of the FCPA, or, as a second choice, internationalizing the norms
abroad. From 1998–2003, after the government had pursued the latter course of
action and with its partners concluded the anti-bribery OECD Convention, the
United States gradually increased enforcement while the OECD partners focused
on monitoring each other’s implementation of the Convention’s prohibitions
into domestic law. Then, beginning in 2003 and over the next ten years, US
enforcement of the FCPA dramatically increased. Data on FCPA enforcement
over that decade reveal two clear trends: a notable expansion of enforcement and
a significant expansion of jurisdiction.
D. EXPANSION OF ENFORCEMENT

In expanding their FCPA enforcement activities, the DOJ and the SEC have
pursued more corporate enforcement actions; have extracted ever-increasing
criminal fines, penalties, disgorgements of profit and other pecuniary damages;
have pursued a greater number of actions against individuals; and have increasingly
relied on deferred-prosecution and non-prosecution agreements to do so.
1.

MORE CORPORATE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Since 2003 the DOJ and the SEC have concluded a combined total 166 FCPA
enforcement actions—representing a five-fold increase over the previous 25-year
period in the average annual rate of enforcement. Table 1 shows the number of
enforcement actions against corporations per year, 2002–2013.
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TABLE 1 – CORPORATE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS PER YEAR, 2002–2013
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2.

HUGE FINES

Perhaps more noteworthy than the number of enforcement actions is the increased
value of criminal and civil fines, disgorgements of profits, and other penalties
imposed in these actions.23 Total corporate fines over the period 2003–2014
reached more than $5 billion (see Table 2), with the average corporate penalty
ranging from a low of $5.5 million in 2005 to a high of $86 million in 2010 (see
Table 3). A notable year for enforcement was 2010, as 21 corporate enforcement
actions were issued yielding approximately $1.8 billion in fines and penalties.
Even excluding 2010 as an anomaly, the average fine levied on corporations
for FCPA violations from 2004–2013 was approximately $39 million. Several
notable cases yielding fines greater than $100 million have proved particularly
headline-grabbing: Siemens ($800 million) in 2008; Haliburton/KBR ($579
million) in 2009; Technip ($338 million) and BAE Systems ($400 million) in

23. The figures in this section are the author’s calculations based on the raw data in the Shearman
& Sterling Report. See supra note 6.
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2010;24 JGC Corp ($218 million) in 2011; and Total S.A. ($398 million) in
2013. It is also notable that five of these six cases involved non-US entities.
TABLE 2 – TOTAL CORPORATE FINES PER YEAR, 2003–2014
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TABLE 3 – AVERAGE CORPORATE PENALTIES, 2004–2013
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24. Technically, BAE was not actually charged with an FCPA liability. Alongside a guilty plea to
charges by the UK Serious Fraud Office (yielding what many observers considered to be a
paltry fine of £30 million), BAE pleaded guilty in the United States to violating both the US
Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms regulations, as well as to conspiring
to defraud the United States by impairing and impeding its lawful functions and to make
false statements about its FCPA compliance program. Nevertheless, this action is included in
the Shearman & Sterling LLP database of FCPA enforcement actions and is widely accepted
as an FCPA enforcement action.
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3.

ENFORCEMENT AGAINST INDIVIDUALS

In addition to an increased number of corporate enforcement actions, the
DOJ has increased its enforcement of the FCPA specifically against individual
defendants.25 Table 4 shows the number of individuals charged per year,
2002–2013. From 2003–2013, 142 individuals were implicated in 59 FCPA
enforcement actions and 45 individuals were criminally sentenced to probation
or to prison—far more than in any other jurisdiction enforcing rules against
transnational bribery. FCPA prison sentences have varied widely, ranging from 9
months up to 15 years, with the average prison sentence just under three years.
During the same period, individuals guilty of FCPA violations have also been
charged over $180 million in penalties. The average individual fine or penalty per
enforcement action is $32 million.
TABLE 4 – ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS,
2002–2013, AVERAGE AMOUNT IN MILLION ($)
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This level of individual enforcement had been meant as a clear signal to
executives and employees at all levels that the US government intended to hold
them—not just their firms—criminally responsible should they be found guilty of
FCPA violations. Enforcement against individuals was a cornerstone of the DOJ’s
criminal enforcement activities under assistant attorney general Lanny Breuer,
who headed the DOJ criminal division from 2009–2013 and led a concerted
focus on the FCPA. “No matter what,” Breuer noted in 2012, referring to the

25. The figures in this section are the author’s calculations based on the raw data in the Shearman
& Sterling Report. See supra note 6.
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FCPA, “individual executives and employees must answer for their conduct.”26
According to DOJ reasoning, “to have a credible deterrent effect, people have
to go to jail.”27
One reason to pursue cases against individuals is to prevent corporations
from treating fines and penalties as a mere cost of doing business. In addition to
the $800 million in fines and penalties collected in the Siemens case, for instance,
eight executives went to jail. Another reason may be to secure cooperation in
building larger cases against corporate entities or industries as a whole. This
appears to have been at play in the case of Albert “Jack” Stanley, the former
chief executive officer of KBR Inc.—a spinoff of the Houston-based oil services
giant Halliburton—who, in 2012, was sentenced to a two-and-a-half year prison
term for his key role in a wide ranging bribery scheme in Nigeria. Stanley pled
guilty in 2008 and his cooperation enabled the largest bribery prosecution to
proceed at that time, involving multiple companies. According to his lawyer,
Stanley proved to be “the linchpin, the foundation of the largest, most successful
FCPA investigation ever.”28
In another case, in 2012, a former managing director in the Shanghai office
of Morgan Stanley’s real estate group was sentenced to nine months in prison
for conspiring with a Chinese government official and a Canadian lawyer to
misappropriate a multi-million dollar stake in a Shanghai apartment building
26. One is also tempted to contrast Breuer’s commitment to the deterrent value of the
prosecution under the FCPA of (admittedly, primarily non-US) executives with his consistent
refusal to do so in connection with fraud in the financial crisis of 2008. In this connection,
the criticism of Judge Jed Rakoff of the United States Court for the Southern District of New
York is well-known: “But if, by contrast, the Great Recession was in material part the product
of intentional fraud, the failure to prosecute those responsible must be judged one of the
more egregious failures of the criminal justice system in many years.” See Jed S Rakoff, “The
Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?” (9 January 2014),
The New York Review of Books, online: <www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/
financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions>.
27. On the other hand, Mike Koehler argues that that the emphasis on individual enforcement
may be nothing more than cheap talk and empty rhetoric, as the vast majority of FCPA
enforcement actions are against corporations—possibly because these are the source of more
lucrative fines and penalties, especially since the use of corporate DPAs and NPAs (discussed
in Part II(A)(4), below) makes them easier to conclude. See Mike Koehler, The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act in a New Era (Northampton, Mass: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014)
[Koehler, New Era]; Cortney C Thomas, “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of
Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified” (2009) 29:2 Rev Litig 439 at 458.
28. Laurel Brubaker Calkins, “Ex-KBR CEO Stanley Gets 2 1/2 Years in Prison for Foreign
Bribes,” Bloomberg Business (24 February 2012), online: <www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-02-23/ex-kbr-ceo-albert-stanley-gets-30-month-prison-term-in-nigeriabribe-case.html>.
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being sold by a Morgan Stanley fund. From 2004–2007, Peterson acquired
millions in real estate investments for himself and the Chinese official, in
exchange for business the official provided to Morgan Stanley’s funds.29
The longest sentence imposed on an individual for FCPA violations remains
fifteen years, given to Joel Esquanazi, the former president of a US-based
telecommunications firm who conspired to pay more than $890,000 over several
years to shell companies for the purpose of bribing Haitian government officials in
exchange for various business advantages, including preferred telecommunications
rates and continued telecommunications connections with Haiti. Esquanazi’s
co-defendant received a seven-year sentence, and both sentences were upheld
on appeal in 2014.30 At the time the DOJ noted that the sentence would be “a
stark reminder to executives that bribing government officials to secure business
advantages is a serious crime with serious consequences. … [W]e will continue to
hold accountable individuals and companies who engage in such corruption.”31
4.

DIVERSION AGREEMENTS

In addition to the increased number of enforcement actions against individuals and
corporations, a particular hallmark of recent FCPA enforcement is the prevalence
of deferred-prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements
(NPAs)—known as “diversion agreements”—in FCPA enforcement.32 These
means of escaping prosecution permit corporations implicated in FCPA violations
to avoid criminal prosecution in exchange for admission of wrongdoing and
29. Chad Bray, “Morgan Stanley Ex-Official in China Sentenced to 9 Months in Prison,”
The Wall Street Journal (16 August 2012), online: WSJ Blogs <online.wsj.com/articles/
SB10000872396390444508504577593950506343444>; Christopher M Matthews,
“Former Morgan Stanley Exec Gets Nine Months in FCPA Case,” The Wall Street Journal
(17 August 2012), online: WSJ Blogs <blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/08/17/
former-morgan-stanley-exec-gets-nine-months-in-fcpa-case>.
30. “United States v. Esquenazi: Eleventh Circuit Defines ‘Government Instrumentality’ Under
the FCPA” (2005) 128 Harv L Rev 1500; “Esquenazi Jailed 15 Years, Rodriguez Gets
7 Years - The FCPA Blog - The FCPA Blog,” online: <http://fcpablog.squarespace.com/
blog/2011/10/26/esquenazi-jailed-15-years-rodriguez-gets-7-years.html>.
31. Office of Public Affairs, News Release, 11-1407, “Executive Sentenced to 15 Years in
Prison for Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Telecommunications Company
in Haiti” (25 October 2011), online: US Department of Justice <www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/executive-sentenced-15-years-prison-scheme-bribe-officials-state-ownedtelecommunications>.
32. Severin Wirz, Private Settlements, Public Concerns: Judicial Scrutiny of Deferred Prosecution
Agreements (Annapolis, Md: Trace International, 2013), online: <https://www.
traceinternational.org/Uploads/PublicationFiles/PrivateSettlementsPublicConcernsJudicialScrutinyofDeferredProsecutionAgreements.pdf>.
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various other stipulations related to reform, such as undertaking comprehensive
compliance systems, hiring compliance advisors, paying significant financial
penalties, and restitution. Diversion agreements have become an essential
component of FCPA enforcement: Since 2008 not a single corporate criminal
action for FCPA violations has been concluded without a DPA or NPA in place.33
As Thomas34 recounts, the DOJ initially conceived of pre-trial diversion of
corporate criminal cases as a potential reward prosecutors could bestow upon
corporations in exchange for cooperation in FCPA investigations. Diversion
agreements were also seen as a useful tool for instigating changes in corporate
culture in favour of more rigorous FCPA compliance. In addition, in the wake of
the 2001–2002 Arthur Anderson scandal, in which the firm itself went bankrupt
and thousands of people lost their jobs due to the malfeasance of a relatively
small unit of the company, the DOJ has come to view DPAs and NPAs as a sort
of corporate harm-reduction strategy in an era of heightened enforcement. Not
least, this new approach to prosecution also seems to have been a boon for the
extraction of ever-greater financial penalties.
In addition to securing cooperation, influencing corporate culture, mitigating
systemic risk to defendants, and generating lucrative fines, prosecution diversion
agreements avoid lengthy investigations, costly evidence gathering, and expensive
trials. By the same token, however, as critics have noted, enforcement via DPAs
and NPAs has facilitated the extra-judicial enforcement authority of the DOJ
and the SEC, in which the absence of trial judgments precludes the development
of case law which might limit the reach of FCPA enforcement and on which
FCPA defenses might otherwise be based.35
5.

WILL THE TREND OF EXPANDED ENFORCEMENT CONTINUE?

Another notable aspect of increased enforcement serves somewhat as a caveat: The
data reveal sharp spikes in enforcement as a function of one or two record-breaking
cases. Specifically, the UN Oil-for-Food scandal and the wide-ranging Siemens
bribery scandal alone are responsible for enforcement spikes in the period
2008–2010. As cases resulting from these massive investigations are resolved,
it is possible that these years will remain outliers and that the trend of increased
enforcement will recede. On the other hand, given that a number of companies
33. Note that diversion agreements protect the corporate defendant from criminal penalties,
while individual miscreants may still receive criminal convictions and jail terms.
34. Supra note 27 at 455.
35. See Mike Koehler, “FCPA 101” (2016) (blog), online: FCPA Professor <www.
fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101>.
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continue to disclose investigations and the pipeline of cases the DOJ and the
SEC intend to resolve continues to grow, this trend is more likely to continue.
In addition, the FCPA Unit of the SEC’s enforcement division has markedly
increased its scrutiny on compliance, through a heightened focus on assessing
the sufficiency of companies’ efforts to comply with the SEC’s anti-bribery and
books and records measures. The SEC has emphasized that corporate FCPA
compliance programs must be integrated into companies’ overall systems of
compliance controls. In other words, companies must have in place customized
compliance programs that address bribery and reporting risks specific to each
individual company’s business; “one size fits all” or “off the shelf ” compliance
programs are deemed insufficient.36 In the present regulatory environment in
which the Sarbanes-Oxley Act37 and Dodd-Frank Act38 already present a heightened
focus on corporate governance, financial reporting and oversight, and corporate
compliance, FCPA scrutiny and compliance are likely to continue to yield
significant enforcement actions in the coming years.39
E.

EXPANSION OF JURISDICTION

In addition to expanded enforcement efforts through various actions, including
investigations, DPAs, NPAs, and individual prosecutions, a hallmark of FCPA
enforcement in the past ten years has also been an increase in enforcement against
foreign issuers and nationals, and a notable expansion of the basis upon which
the DOJ asserts jurisdiction in FCPA enforcement. Since its introduction in
1977, the FCPA has always included elements of extraterritoriality, in that it
applied to actions occurring outside the territory of the United States. However,
the original statute applied only to domestic concerns and US citizens, and
it included elements that required a territorial nexus to the United States for
the jurisdiction of the American courts and law enforcement to apply to acts
of bribery abroad. Then, the 1998 amendments to the FCPA expanded its
36. Randall J Fons, Brian Neil Hoffman & Tiffany A Rowe, “The SEC Speaks: Reflections and
Enforcement Initiatives in 2011” Morrison Foerster LLP (5 March 2013), online: Mondaq
<http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/226264/Securities/The+SEC+Speaks+Reflections+
And+Enforcement+Initiatives+In+2013>.
37. “Text of H.R. 3763 (107th): Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Passed Congress/Enrolled Bill
version),” online: GovTrack.us <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/hr3763/text>.
38. Barney Frank, “Text - H.R.4173 - 111th Congress (2009-2010): Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act,” (21 July 2010), online: <https://www.congress.gov/
bill/111th-congress/house-bill/4173/text?overview=closed>.
39. See Heidi L Hansberry, “In Spite of Its Good Intentions, the Dodd-Frank Act Has Created
an FCPA Monster” (2012) 102:1 J Crim L & Criminology 195.
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jurisdiction over non-US entities. Though still requiring some territorial nexus,
the 1998 amendments introduced non-US issuers as subjects of the law for the
first time. In addition, as it has been applied over the past decade, the definition
of what constitutes a territorial nexus has been stretched to include ever more
broad extra-territorial reach.
6.

ENFORCEMENT AGAINST FOREIGN ISSUERS AND NATIONALS

In recent years both the DOJ and the SEC have increased enforcement actions
against foreign entities and individuals.40 Since 2003, more than one-third of
enforcement actions against individuals have been against foreign (non-US
citizen) defendants. In some years, the rate of enforcement against foreign
defendants has been much higher; in 2011, for instance, 85 per cent of individual
defendants in FCPA cases were non-US nationals. As for corporate enforcement
actions, 40 per cent since 2003 have been against foreign issuers; in particular,
some of the most notable actions yielding the greatest fines have been against
foreign issuers rather than domestic concerns.
The first time the DOJ took criminal enforcement action against a foreign
issuer for violating the FCPA was in the Statoil case, which the DOJ resolved
in 2006. This case involved illicit payments (totalling $15.2 million over 11
years) by a Norwegian oil and gas company to an Iranian Oil Ministry official,
in exchange for oil and gas contracts. To resolve the matter, the Norwegian
firm agreed to a $10.5 million criminal penalty and entered into a three-year
DPA. The DPA included a requirement that Statoil hire an FCPA consultant in
addition to other reforms.41 At the time, the DOJ intended this case “to send
a clear message today that if a foreign company trades on US exchanges and
benefits from US capital markets, it is subject to our laws. The Department will
not hesitate to enforce the FCPA against foreign-owned companies, just as it does
against American companies.”42
In the past decade, 37 per cent of all foreign bribery actions and investigations
by the US have involved a company headquartered outside the United States
40. The figures in this section are the author’s calculations based on the raw data in the Shearman
& Sterling Report. See supra note 6.
41. US Securities and Exchange Commission, “SEC Sanctions Statoil for Bribes to Iranian
Government Official,” (13 October 2006), online: <https://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2006/2006-174.htm>.
42. Alice S Fisher, Address (Remarks delivered at the American Bar Association National
Institute on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Washington, DC, 16 October 2006),
online: <www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/10-1606AAGFCPASpeech.pdf>.
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or an individual employed or retained by such a company. Key examples of
such enforcement include cases against the Swiss firm Panalpina,43 Germany’s
Siemens,44 and the UK’s BAE Systems,45 all of which concerned non-US
companies headquartered outside the United States engaged in behaviour
outside the United States proscribed by the FCPA (and also prohibited by the
OECD Convention).46
7.

INCREASINGLY EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE FCPA’S
JURISDICTIONAL REACH

Not only has enforcement against foreign issuers and foreign nationals increased,
the DOJ and the SEC have also significantly expanded the basis upon which
they argue for the required nexus between the foreign entity or individual and
the United States.47 A 2011 case concerning the engineering, procurement, and
construction contracts to design and build a liquefied natural gas plant and
related constructions on Bonny Island, Nigeria is particularly illustrative of the
widening jurisdictional application of the FCPA. The defendant in this case,
JGC Corporation (“JGC”), was the first Japanese company prosecuted under
the FCPA and is neither a domestic US concern nor an issuer of securities in the
US capital markets or on its exchanges. Jurisdiction was based on JGC’s role in
“conspiring to execute the bribery scheme with co-conspirators who are domestic
concerns or issuers, and causing allegedly corrupt US dollar payments to be wire
transferred via correspondent bank accounts in New York.”48
In 2012 the DOJ and the SEC issued a 120-page guidance document (the
“2012 Guide”) to clarify for compliance purposes the FCPA’s rules concerning
personal jurisdiction. While confirming that issuers and domestic concerns are
subject to the FCPA by virtue of nationality, and foreign entities may be subject
43. Mike Koehler, “FCPA Professor: All About Panalpina” (30 December 2010) (blog), online:
<http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.ca/2010/12/all-about-panalpina.html>.
44. United States Department of Justice, “Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty
to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined
Criminal Fines: Coordinated Enforcement Actions by DOJ, SEC and German Authorities
Result in Penalties of $1.6 Billion,” (15 December 2008), online: <http://www.justice.gov/
archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html>.
45. United States Department of Justice, “BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay
$400 Million Criminal Fine,” (1 March 2010), online: Justice News <http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/bae-systems-plc-pleads-guilty-and-ordered-pay-400-million-criminal-fine>.
46. OECD, supra note 18.
47. Natasha N Wilson, “Pushing the Limits of Jurisdiction Over Foreign Actors Under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (2014) 91:4 Wash L Rev 1063.
48. Urofsky, supra note 6 at 46.

GUTTERMAN, BANNING BRIBES ABROAD

51

by way of the territoriality principle for acts committed in the United States in
furtherance of a violation, the 2012 Guide further asserts FCPA jurisdiction over
“a foreign national or company [that] aids and abets, conspires with, or acts as an
agent of an issuer or domestic concern, regardless of whether the foreign national
or company itself takes any action in the United States.”49 This interpretation
may exceed what the language of the statute actually allows.50
Most recently, in 2013 the French firm Total SA paid the third largest
settlement in FCPA history ($398 million) in a case with only the most tenuous
of jurisdictional connections. The case involved improper conduct alleged to
have occurred between 1995 and 1997, during which time the French oil and
gas company allegedly bribed an Iranian official through use of an employee of a
Swiss private bank and a British Virgin Islands company. The sole US territorial
nexus (the required legal element for an anti-bribery violation, since Total SA is
a foreign issuer) was a 1995 wire transfer of $500,000 (representing less than 1
per cent of the alleged bribe payments at issue) from a New York based account.51
8.

RECENT COURT CASES

Two recent cases illustrate the extent to which jurisdiction remains one of the
FCPA’s most questionable statutory issues. In February 2013, Judge Richard J.
Sullivan of the US District Court for the Southern District of New York denied
a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the case of SEC v Elek Straub, Andras
Balogh, and Tamas Morvai. The defendants, three Hungarian former executives
of Hungarian firm Magyar Telekom (majority-owned by Germany’s Deutsche
Telekom AG), were charged with orchestrating a scheme to bribe public officials
in Macedonia and with providing false and misleading financial representations
to auditors and to the SEC. The defendants’ actions had triggered the personal
jurisdiction of the court, Sullivan decided, because they were “engaged in
conduct that was designed to violate the United States securities regulations” and
49. Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice and the Enforcement Division of the
US Securities and Exchange Commission,“FCPA: A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act” (2012), online: US Department of Justice <www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf>.
50. See Bruce J Casino & Scott Maberry, “FCPA, Due Process, and Jurisdictional Overreach by
the DOJ and SEC” (2013) 13:3 Crim Litig 5.
51. Mike Koehler, “Total Agrees To Pay $398 Million To Resolve Its FCPA Scrutiny” (30
May 2013) (blog), online: FCPA Professor <http://fcpaprofessor.com/total-agrees-to-pay398-million-to-resolve-its-fcpa-scrutiny/>; Mike Koehler, “‘Total’ly Milking The FCPA
Cash Cow?” (3 June 2013) (blog), online: FCPA Professor <http://fcpaprofessor.com/
totally-milking-the-fcpa-cash-cow/>.
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therefore directed towards the United States.52 In addition, the defendants’ use
of email messages in furtherance of the bribery scheme “from locations outside
the United States [and to recipients also outside the United States] but routed
through and/or stored on network servers located within the United States” was
sufficient to trigger territorial jurisdiction—whether or not the defendants had
the intention of using any US means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce
in furtherance of their bribery scheme.
In the same month, Judge Shira Sheindlin, also of the US District Court for
the Southern District of New York, granted a motion to dismiss charges against
Herbert Steffen, the former chief executive officer of Siemens S.A. Argentina,
the Argentine subsidiary of Germany’s Siemens AG. In this case, the SEC had
charged seven former executives of Siemens with a decade-long program of
bribing public officials in Argentina to obtain a $1 billion contract to produce
national identity cards for Argentine citizens. Judge Sheindlin agreed with the
defendant’s submission that Steffen, a German national, had virtually no contact
with the United States (and that his actions were not directed against the United
States) and therefore the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him.
Despite the different outcomes, both judges applied similar analyses in
these cases to decide on the jurisdiction of the US District Court over foreign
corporate bribery schemes by foreign nationals. The contrasting outcomes result
from important differences in the facts of each case, not from conflicting points
of law. Judge Sullivan’s decision, in particular, appears to support current DOJ
and SEC theories of jurisdiction, which assert that minor or pass-through acts,
such as wire transfers or emails through American correspondent bank accounts,
are sufficient to establish jurisdiction, even if the money or correspondence is not
knowingly or intentionally routed to the United States and does not remain in
the United States for a significant length of time.53
Moreover, although Judge Sheindlin’s decision does set limits on the
personal jurisdiction of the court over non-US actors, the government clearly
has established—through the 2012 Guide and elsewhere—that it intends to
assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants accused of bribery, aiding and abetting
bribery, or conspiracy to bribe, even when the defendants themselves may not be
directly implicated in acts of bribery per se.54
52. “SEC v. Straub (Decision on Motion to Dismiss)” (8 February 2013), online: Scribd
<https://www.scribd.com/doc/124824258/SEC-v-Straub-Decision-on-Motion-to-Dismiss>.
53. Lauren Ann Ross, “Using Foreign Relations Law to Limit Extraterritorial Application of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (2012) 62:2 Duke LJ 445.
54. Urofsky, supra note 6 at x.
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Perhaps most importantly, both decisions stand as clear exceptions to the
trend toward the use of diversion agreements in FCPA enforcement. As stated
above, nearly all of the criminal corporate resolutions of the past ten years have
been in the form of deferred or non-prosecution agreements, while resolutions of
corporate civil cases brought by the SEC mainly have consisted of administrative
cease-and-desist orders and civil settlements. The practical consequence of these
resolutions for businesses are allegations of wrongdoing, admissions of guilt in
criminal cases, penalties, monitoring or reporting, limits of public statements,
and bad publicity.55 The main consequence for the legal environment in which
businesses operate, however, is that DPAs and NPAs, generally, have been
exempt from judicial scrutiny.56 It may be that in overreaching on jurisdiction
the government expects that companies will choose to settle with diversion
agreements rather than to test the limits of the government’s jurisdiction in
court.57 Thus it stands that although US courts up to and including the Supreme
Court have been limiting the extraterritorial application of US law in recent cases
such as Morrison v Australia National Bank, Ltd in 200958 and Kiobel v Royal Dutch
Shell Co59 in 2013,60 the area of FCPA enforcement remains one of expanding
extraterritoriality in which the US anti-corruption law reaches farther and farther
into global regulatory environments and into other sovereign jurisdictions.

55. Ibid at viii.
56. A recent decision has held that the court, pursuant to its “supervisory power,” has authority
to approve and oversee the implementation of DPAs, though not NPAs, which fall into
the government’s “absolute discretion to decide not to prosecute.” This may influence the
DOJ’s decision to pursue NPAs as opposed to DPAs in future enforcement actions. For this
commentary that arose in a non-FCPA case, see US v HSBC Bank USA, NA, 14-1606 (6th
Cir 2015) (Judge John Gleeson).
57. Casino & Maberry, supra note 50.
58. Morrison et al v National Australia Bank Ltd et al, 561 US 1 (2010), online: Supreme
Court of the United States <http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1191.
pdf> [Morrison].
59. Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 569 US 1 (2013), online: Supreme Court of the United
States <http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/10-1491_l6gn.pdf> [Kiobel].
60. Paul B Stephan, “The Political Economy of Extraterritoriality” (2013) 1:1 Pol & Governance
92; Claire Bright, “The Implications of the Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Case for the
Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction” in Adriana Di Stefano, ed, A Lackland Law? Territory,
Effectiveness and Jurisdiction in International and EU Law (Torino, Italy: G Giappichelli
Editore, 2015) 165.
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III. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Why do the expansion of FCPA enforcement and extraterritoriality in FCPA
enforcement matter? What are the implications of these developments?
In the first place, as leading FCPA observers have noted, these trends obviously
mean that any issuer with registered US securities and their employees—whether
US or non US persons—should be increasingly wary of running afoul of the
FCPA in this “new era” of enforcement.61 In fact, as enforcement has increased
and the risks of prosecution for bribing abroad have grown, an entire industry
of FCPA compliance experts, consultants, trainers, lawyers, investigators, and
researchers has arisen to meet the concerns of business in the new regulatory
environment. If one is interested in following day-to-day developments in
FCPA enforcement in this compliance industry, one can follow any number of
online publications such as the widely-read FCPA Blog,62 FCPA Professor,63 and
Compliance Week,64 subscribe to services like those of TRACE International,65
and contract the services of such FCPA compliance firms as Risk Advisory,66
Mintz Group,67 FTI Comply,68 Alix Partners,69 and many others that advertise
on the various online FCPA blogs and publications (not to mention a host of US
and foreign law firms and consulting firms). FCPA compliance is big business,
and lawyers, accountants, and consultants have been making fortunes helping
companies to navigate the new FCPA enforcement environment.70
At the same time, recent patterns of FCPA enforcement hold at least two
deeper implications for the global governance of corruption: US enforcement
61. Koehler, New Era, supra note 27.
62. Richard L Cassin & Recathlon LLC, “The FCPA Blog” (2016) (blog), online: <http://www.
fcpablog.com/#>.
63. Mike Koehler, “FCPA Professor” (2016) (blog), online: <http://fcpaprofessor.com/>.
64. Wilmington Compliance Week Inc., “Compliance Week” (2016), online: <https://www.
complianceweek.com/>.
65. Trace International, Inc., “Trace: Anti-Bribery Compliance Solutions,” online: <http://www.
traceinternational.org/>.
66. The Risk Advisory Group, “Risk Advisory,” online: <https://www.riskadvisory.net/>.
67. Mintz Group, “Mintz Group,” (2016), online: <https://mintzgroup.com/>.
68. FTI Consulting, Inc., “FTI Comply: Third Party Due Diligence Solution,” (2016), online:
<http://www.fticonsulting.com/insights/featured-perspectives/fti-comply>.
69. AlixPartners LLP, “Financial Advisory Services,” (2016), online: <http://www.alixpartners.
com/en/Services/FinancialAdvisoryServices.aspx>.
70. See Nathan Vardi, “The Bribery Racket,” Forbes (7 June 2010), online: <www.forbes.
com/global/2010/0607/companies-payoffs-washington-extortion-mendelsohnbribery-racket.html>.
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of the FCPA promotes anti-bribery and anti-corruption policies and enforcement
abroad, leading to the development of an ever-more robust framework of
anti-corruption governance at the global level; it also shapes and constrains the
direction and manner of global anti-corruption governance, in both intentional
and unintentional ways.
F.

ANTI-CORRUPTION PROMOTION

On the one hand, US enforcement of the FCPA can be read as a laudable effort
by the United States to contribute to the global prohibition regime against
transnational bribery and corruption, particularly that associated with the OECD
anti-bribery convention. Political science research, for instance, has shown a
powerful association between extraterritorial FCPA enforcement actions by US
prosecutors and the national enforcement of foreign bribery regulations in target
countries. Kaczmarek and Newman71 found that jurisdictions that experienced
US intervention were twenty times more likely to enforce their own national
anti-corruption rules than jurisdictions that received no FCPA attention. In this
sense, the FCPA stands as a key tool of the global anti-corruption regime, in
which the United States is the leading enforcer. To the extent that transnational
bribery distorts markets, disrupts international flows of goods and capital,
reduces economic growth, impedes fair market competition, obstructs liberal
international trade, impedes sustainable development, and perpetuates poverty,
this enforcement promotes positive outcomes and mutual benefits in global
politics. As Rose-Ackerman puts it, “[T]here is a need for US leadership in this
area of global concern.”72
G. SHAPING—AND CONSTRAINING—INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION
EFFORTS

At the same time, however, the extraterritorial application of the FCPA to ban
bribery abroad raises important questions concerning the roles of power, legitimacy,
justice, cooperation, efficacy, and national interest in global governance. As such,
the impact of this legislation on the scope and direction of global anti-corruption
efforts requires further scrutiny. Three aspects of FCPA enforcement in particular
serve to constrain the broader goals of global anti-corruption efforts: the
71. See Sarah C Kaczmarek & Abraham L Newman, “The Long Arm of the Law:
Extraterritoriality and the National Implementation of Foreign Bribery Legislation” (2011)
65:4 Int’l Org 745.
72. Susan Rose-Ackerman, “International Anti-Corruption Policies and the U.S. National
Interest” (2013) 107 Am Soc Int’l L Proc 252 at 255.
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narrow conception of corruption upon which the FCPA is based, the strategic
trade frame that underlies the FCPA’s internationalization, and the legitimacy
problems these suggest.
1.

NARROW CONCEPTION OF CORRUPTION

Given its stringent enforcement of the FCPA, the United States stands today
as the most significant promoter and enforcer of anti-corruption norms in the
global economy. To the extent that US leadership in the global governance of
corruption is activated by FCPA enforcement, however, it fulfils this role on the
basis of the specific conception of corruption included in the FCPA: transactional
bribery. Specifically, the FCPA prohibits any offer, payment, promise to pay, or
authorization of the payment of money or anything of value to any person,
while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered,
given or promised, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official to influence the foreign
official in his or her official capacity, induce the foreign official to do or omit to do
an act in violation of his or her lawful duty, or to secure any improper advantage in
order to assist in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business
to, any person.73

Transactional bribery of this sort is well illustrated in models of corruption
based on Principal-Agent (PA) theory.74 Derived from economic theory, the PA
approach conceptualizes corruption as an incentive-driven individual choice
within an institutional context in which institutional failure leads to a breakdown
(corruption) in the optimal allocation of resources and outcomes. Put differently,
in the PA model agents are presumed to act on behalf of principals that have
delegated authority to agents and that are empowered to monitor and enforce the
extent to which the agents carry out the principal’s instructions. Corruption enters
the picture when a third party, whose gains or losses depend on the principal or
the agent, interferes with the appropriate principal-agent relationship. In the PA
model, corruption is defined as any unauthorized transaction between an agent
and a third party—usually bribery—and is an instance of institutional failure.75

73. FCPA, supra note 1, §30A, (a) 3.
74. Nico Groenendijk, “A Principal-Agent Model of Corruption” (1997) 27:3-4 Crime L & Soc
Change 207; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and
Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Donatella della Porta & Alberto
Vannucci, Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption
(Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter, 1999).
75. Ibid.
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While transactional bribery certainly is the most basic and universally
recognized manifestation of corruption around the world, it is only one aspect
of the complex patterns and myriad forms of corruption that affect the daily
lives of ordinary people.76 Broader, network-based patterns of corruption—
such as kleptocratic regime practices, including outright theft from the public
treasury by governing elites; the infiltration of official bodies by organized crime;
election-rigging; illicit political campaign finance; and various other forms of
police, judicial, and political corruption—are not necessarily structured as the
kind of explicit quid pro quo transaction that is often assumed to be the hallmark
of a corrupt relationship. In contrast to the focus on individual decision-making
and institutional failure in the PA model of corruption, network-based models
of corruption illuminate the non-transactional social aspects of corruption. They
focus on how informal institutions such as culture, religion, social norms, and
various kinds of personal networks can shape systemic corruption in a society.
More specifically, they reveal the manner in which informal and exclusive networks
based on mutual trust and reciprocity—rather than an explicit quid pro quo—
conceal illicit activity within legitimate organizations and networks, and how
corruption can flourish even in advanced democracies—not just in developing
societies with presumably weaker bureaucratic institutions prone to bribery.
For example, in the Elf-Aquitaine scandal in France in the 1990s, elite social
and political networks linked members of the French political class, created
patterns of both formal and informal relationships, and permitted both legitimate
and illegitimate pursuits within established institutions. In particular, a policy
network comprised of graduates of the elite French postgraduate schools including
the prestigious École National D’Administration overlapped with elite business
and social networks. Illicit networks of associates across these spheres easily
became nested within legitimate associations, enabling corruption in France to
occur on a grand scale—not always connected to explicit transactional bribery.77
In other contexts, social networks based on primary interpersonal
relationships such as family, kinship, and ethnicity can slant officials’ exchanges
and communications and shape their norms to favour close relatives and other
groups or individuals over the interests of the general public. Examples include
patrimonial and neo-patrimonial politics in countries like Afghanistan and many

76. For the seminal contribution on bribery, see John Thomas Noonan, Bribes (Berkeley, Cal:
Macmillan, 1984).
77. See John R Heilbrunn, “Oil and Water? Elite Politicians and Corruption in France” (2005)
37:3 Comp Pol 277.
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African and Asian states.78 Social networks based on secondary relations such
as professional and religious ties can also produce non-transactional corruption
in countries with more advanced bureaucracies. Guanxi networks in China, for
example, indicate the presence of direct, particularistic ties between individuals
or organizations that draw on underlying moral principles derived from the
Confucian heritage—including hierarchy, interdependence, and reciprocity—to
fill in governance gaps during periods of uncertain transition, relative disorder,
and social inequality.79 Guanxi and social networks like it often override the
norms and desired outcomes of formal institutions and produce corruption
without necessarily including specific bribery transactions.
Furthermore, scholarly studies of criminal networks reveal how these often
substitute bribery with violence, coercion, and terrorist-like activities to extract
gains and exert influence in and from political institutions.80 Criminal behaviour
and coercive methods—which have been especially important sources of
corruption in the transition and post-transition Eastern European countries as well
as in several African and Latin American countries, and do not necessarily entail
the explicit bribery of public officials in the context of business operations—can
have deep impacts on democratic institutions. The effects of criminal-networkbased corruption can reach to the extent of systematically modifying the rules
of public policy to favour illicit activity and personal gain from within a regime.
In some cases, criminal organizations fully supplant the institutions of the state;
in such cases, identifiable instances of transactional bribery are merely the tip
of the iceberg.81
For all its vigour and surrounding rhetoric about stamping out corruption in
international business, however, US enforcement of the FCPA challenges none of
these corruption-network practices. Rather, it funnels anti-corruption resources
and attention to a narrow focus on transactional bribery in international business,
in a manner that resembles the “stovepiping,”82 which has been identified as a
problem in the global governance of health. “Stovepiping” in that context refers
78. See e.g. Ron Holt, “Beyond the Tribe: Patron-Client Relations, Neopatrimonialism in
Afghanistan” (2012) 38:1 Mil Intel Prof Bull 27; Mushtaq H Khan, “Patron-Client
Networks and the Economic Effects of Corruption in Asia” (1998) 10:1 Eur J Dev Res 15.
79. See Jing Vivian Zhan, “Filling the Gap of Formal Institutions: The Effects of Guanxi
Network on Corruption in Reform-Era China” (2012) 58:2 Crime, L & Soc Change 93.
80. See e.g. Luis Garay-Salamanca, “Institutional Impact of Criminal Networks in Colombia and
Mexico” (2012) 57:2 Crime, L & Soc Change 177; Louise I Shelley, “The Unholy Trinity:
Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism” (2005) 11:2 Brown J World Aff 101.
81. See Shelley, “Transnational Organized Crime,” supra note 13.
82. Laurie Garrett, “The Challenge of Global Health” (2007) 86:1 Foreign Aff 14.
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to a pattern in which resources are funnelled down a narrow channel—say, to
a specific focus on HIV/AIDS transmission rather than maternal health more
generally—at the expense of broader goals. As Laurie Garrett puts it, stovepiping
tends to reflect the interests of aid donors, not its recipients.83 Put in terms of
the global regime of anti-corruption, US enforcement of the FCPA reflects US
interests and not those of the millions of people around the world who are in
desperate need of credible and effective strategies to curb the most damaging
manifestations of corruption. The stovepiping of anti-corruption enforcement
through the FCPA’s narrow focus on bribery in international business should
yield to a broader understanding of anti-corruption enforcement and a far more
generalized, global approach to curbing corruption in its many forms.
In sum, corruption is not always as obvious as the payment of money
in exchange for services rendered, the perversion of agency relationships by
third parties, or “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”84 It can be
much more subtle (and also deeply societally-entrenched), having to do with
longstanding relationships of mutual benefit, exchanges of favours among people
in advantageous positions, and expectations of reciprocity within ongoing
relationships maintained by exclusive networks of trust, both licit and illicit. In
such cases, anti-corruption policies that do not take into account the informal
institutions of society that may sustain corruption—culture, religion, ethnic
norms, or various types of social network—are doomed to fail. And yet the FCPA
embraces a narrow conception of corruption focused exclusively on transactional
bribery. Also ignored in the statute—and, consequently, in the global regime—
are the broader patterns of transnational corruption networks and the global
practices in which bribery transactions are embedded, which often do not involve
an individual business transaction but in which US actors often are complicit. The
FCPA’s focus on discrete incidents of bribery tends to single out specific actors for
corrupt deeds and specific instances of corrupt transactions rather than tackling
the embedded networks and practices in which opportunities for corruption are
cultivated both locally and in the global economy writ large. Such corruption
entails multiple sets of connected transactions, processes and relationships that

83. Ibid.
84. Transparency International, “What is Corruption?” (2015), online:
<https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption>.
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unfold within a variety of transnational networks—both licit and illicit—and
they are rarely isolated instances that occur exclusively within countries.85
2.

THE STRATEGIC TRADE FRAME

Not only has the efficacy of US anti-corruption policy been constrained by
the FCPA’s narrow focus on bribery transactions, it has also suffered from an
enforcement strategy driven primarily by strategic trade concerns rather than
anti-corruption concerns. Theories of strategic trade explain the conditions
under which states will intervene in trading markets at the industry or firm level
to improve competitiveness and maximize the benefits accruing to the state, the
industry, or the firm.86 Taking a view of trade as competitive rather than as a source
of mutual gain, strategic trade policies are used to raise one state’s income at the
expense of that of a competing state.87 Historically, export promotion policy in
particular has been used by states in the pursuit of national power.88 For decades
leading up to the emergence of the global regime of anti-corruption in the 1990s,
state support for transnational bribery in the form of tax deductibility, financial
support through export credit arrangements, or the public characterization of
bribery as a normal business practice functioned as a crucial prong in the toolkit
of export promotion and strategic trade among major trading states.89
Viewed through this lens, the international regime of anti-corruption can be
seen as an attempt by the United States to internationalize specifically American
norms concerning the conduct of international business, which first took shape
in the FCPA. For twenty-odd years following the enactment of the FCPA in
1977, US trade and business interests saw themselves at a disadvantage in the
global market for certain types of bribery-prone transactions, notably arms and
defense-related technology, infrastructure design and construction, and big-ticket
85. See Alexander Cooley & Jason Sharman, “The Price of Access: Transnational Corruption
Networks in Central Asia and Beyond” (Paper delivered at the 2013 Annual Convention of
the International Studies Association, San Francisco, California, 2 April 2013) [unpublished].
86. See e.g. Marc L Busch, Trade Warriors: States, Firms, and Strategic-Trade Policy in
High-Technology Competition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Paul
Krugman & Alasdair Smith, eds, Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1994).
87. For instance, states can intervene by subsidizing favoured firms or industries at the input level
(as with research and development subsidies), at the output level (as with export-promotion
subsidies), or by protecting firms and industries from foreign competition through tariff or
non-tariff trade barriers.
88. See GPE Walzenbach, Co-ordination in Context: Institutional Choices to Promote Exports
(Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1998).
89. See Milliet-Einbinder, supra note 14.

GUTTERMAN, BANNING BRIBES ABROAD

61

sales of goods in the aerospace, telecommunications, energy, and construction
sectors.90 In the strategic trade frame, then, US enforcement of the FCPA is a
response to other states and their firms’ longstanding and routine recourse to
bribery in competitive export markets. The key point is that the central purpose
of US enforcement of the FCPA is to ensure competitive access to global markets
by US firms—not to control corruption more generally. It is an attempt to
internationalize and enforce US policy in the global regulatory environment in
order to shape the international business environment to the advantage of US
enterprises. It is an effort to level the playing field for US based multinationals
by enforcing a standard set of global regulatory rules, rather than a credible or
efficacious policy of anti-corruption.
A skeptical view of US anti-corruption enforcement policy might then ask
two questions: First, is the focus on bribery transactions intended to insulate
the offending organizations and their leadership from prosecution, by focusing
on the individual bribery transaction rather than the organizational pattern
of behaviour? And second, does the focus on individual bribery transactions
undermine the effectiveness of the penalties imposed for offensive activities?
Sanctions and fines imposed without further disruption to a company’s
operations—amounting to only a fraction of the revenue generated by corrupt
transactions—may be internalized by firms as a mere cost of doing business.
Indeed, the US government has not been eager to debar companies found guilty
of FCPA violations from further business dealings with the US government or
from eligibility for US government contracts.
3.

LEGITIMACY

The strategic trade analysis of transnational bribery raises a third point about
the way in which US enforcement of the FCPA shapes and constrains not just
the efficacy of the global regime of anti-corruption, but its legitimacy as well.
Questions of legitimacy raise complicated questions about power, democracy,
ethics, and justice that are often glossed over in global governance, as the most
powerful states—and the non-state actors of which powerful states approve—
tend to be the ones to set the agenda and shape the rules for international action.
As scholars of global governance are increasingly concerned with identifying
the sources of political legitimacy beyond the state, research on legitimacy asks
such questions as: What are the normative, sociological, and political bases of
legitimate global governance? Which actors should exercise power at the global
90. See Transparency International, “Bribe Payers Index: Overview” (2015), online:, <www.
transparency.org/research/bpi/overview>.
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level, and what rules should guide their action? How might the effectiveness of
crucial transnational regimes for governing finance, migration, disease control,
disarmament, and ecological integrity be improved by increasing their legitimate
bases of authority beyond the state? What are the legitimacy criteria for evaluating
the institutional processes of global governance? More critically, what are the
various processes of legitimation at work in global governance? These are deep,
complicated, and important questions, and legitimacy remains a central concern
in ongoing debates about reforming global governance for greater effectiveness,
accountability, and justice.91
With respect to the global governance of anti-corruption, recent patterns
of US enforcement in the regime raise two sets of legitimacy concerns. First,
are the norms, rules, and principles of international anti-corruption right,
correct, and appropriate? Are the makers of these rules right and appropriate
in making them? Is it appropriate to rely on private governance and firm-led
compliance promises to deliver results and expectations concerning the control
of corruption? Other authors have noted that the use of corruption indicators
such as the country-ranking system of Transparency International functions as a
technology of governance and power.92 Similarly, US enforcement of the FCPA in
the global regulatory environment can be read as an exercise of sheer hegemonic
power. Rather than automatically applauding FPCA enforcement as a boon for
global anti-corruption efforts, then, scholars and practitioners should probe more
deeply into the normative implications of US leadership in this area—driven
as it has been by US strategic interests and particularly American norms of
international business regulation.
A second set of legitimacy concerns arises out of the impact of FCPA
enforcement on the centralization of global regulation, which international law
scholar Benedict Kingsbury and others suggest may be contrary to fairness and

91. James Brassett & Eleni Tsingou, “The Politics of Legitimate Global Governance” (2011) 18:1
Rev Int’l Pol Econ 1; Steven Bernstein, “Legitimacy in Intergovernmental and Non-State
Global Governance” (2011) 18:1 Rev Int’l Pol Econ 17; Ellen Gutterman, “The Legitimacy
of Transnational NGOs: Lessons from the Experience of Transparency International in
Germany and France” (2014) 40 Rev Int’l Stud 391.\\uc0\\u8220{}The Legitimacy of
Transnational NGOs: Lessons from the Experience of Transparency International in
Germany and France\\uc0\\u8221{} (2014
92. See e.g. Oded Löwenheim, “Examining the State: A Foucauldian Perspective on International
‘Governance Indicators’” (2008) 29:2 Third World Q 255; Kevin Davis et al, eds,
Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Quantification and Rankings (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012).
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global justice.93 There is a powerful trend towards centralization in international
business regulation and international law generally, which invites an examination
of global enforcement regimes. In the emerging area of Global Administrative
Law (“GAL”), for example, scholars are noting how increasingly developed,
overlapping sets of diverse mechanisms of global regulation have become
important to the strengthening—or erosion—of legitimacy and effectiveness in a
range of governance regimes. GAL has become a focus for examining the extent
to which global regulatory regimes meet sufficient standards of transparency,
consultation, participation, rationality, and legality, and provide effective review
of global rules and decisions.94 A similar analysis of the global anti-corruption
regime is needed. To the extent that the global regime of anti-corruption is
today almost completely driven by unilateral US enforcement of the FCPA in
its current manifestation, this pattern should be scrutinized by the legitimacy
standards established by GAL scholars and assessed on the basis of how it
functions to shape markets as well as legal norms in global business regulations
and anti-corruption policies alike.
H. AGENDA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In sum, US enforcement of the FCPA may be a case of smoke with no fire: Despite
the appearance of vigorous enforcement in the context of the global regime, US
enforcement of the FCPA reflects specifically American political imperatives. It
offers the sheen of activity but very little efficacy at curbing corruption on a
global scale or at reducing in a meaningful way the harmful effects of corruption
in the daily life of ordinary people. And yet extraterritorial enforcement of the
FCPA by the United States remains a crucial component of the global governance
of corruption in the twenty-first century. By extending the scope and reach of
US domestic legislation into the global regulatory environment and into other
sovereign territories, this practice raises broader questions concerning power,
legitimacy, cooperation, efficacy, and national interest in global governance
and international relations generally. New avenues of interdisciplinary research
among international lawyers, political scientists, and scholars of international
relations are needed to pursue these questions.
In the post-Cold War 1990s, interdisciplinary IL/IR scholarship emerged to
explore the various connections among power, interests, institutions, norms, and
93. See Jeffrey L Dunoff & Joel P Trachtman, Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, International
Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
94. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B Stewart, “The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law” (2005) 68:3 Law & Contemp Probs 15.
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law increasingly in evidence in world politics in those years.95 During a time of
unprecedented legalization in international institutions, research specifically on
compliance with international law (e.g., under what conditions are states more
or less likely to comply with their international legal commitments?) introduced
new ways of thinking about international cooperation and also promoted a
broadly liberal normative concern for improving cooperative outcomes through
compliance with international law in a variety of issue areas.96 More recently,
interdisciplinary IL/IR research continues to shed light on the reasons why states
behave the way they do in their relations with one another and with international
institutions, explaining, for instance, how the delegation of legal authority to
international judicial institutions influences global and domestic politics.97
While the study of compliance remains a central preoccupation of
international legal scholarship, and is perhaps its fastest growing subfield,98
scholars are also turning their attention to new developments in extra-territorial
jurisdiction, the application of which by powerful actors has become increasingly
95. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Anthony Tulumello & Stepan Wood, “International Law and
International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship” (1998)
92:3 Am J Int’l L 367.
96. See e.g. Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law, International Relations
and Compliance” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A Simmons, eds, Handbook of
International Relations (London: Sage Publications, 2002); Beth Simmons, “International
Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs”
(2000) 94:4 Am Pol Sci Rev 819; Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New
Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1998); Judith L Goldstein et al, eds, Legalization and World
Politics (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001); Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K Jacobson,
eds, Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental
Accords (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998).eds, {\\i{}Engaging Countries: Strengthening
Compliance with International Environmental Accords}, Global environmental accords series
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998
97. See Karen J Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2014).
98. See Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel, “Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International
Law Really Matters” (2010) 1:2 Global Pol’y 127.and more recently empirical, study of
compliance has become a central preoccupation, and perhaps the fastest growing subfield,
in international legal scholarship. The authors seek to question this trend. They argue that
looking at the aspirations of international law through the lens of rule compliance leads to
inadequate scrutiny and understanding of the diverse complex purposes and projects that
multiple actors impose and transpose on international legality, and especially a tendency
to oversimplify if not distort the relation of inter-national law to politics. Citing a range of
examples from different areas of international law – ranging widely from international trade
and investment to international criminal and humanitarian law – the authors seek to show
how the concept of compliance (especially viewed as rule observance
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frequent.99 So far the literature is hampered by two large gaps: a lack of attention to
the extraterritorial enforcement of anti-corruption law and a dearth of attention
from political scientists and scholars of international relations. Anti-corruption
politics remain an as yet untapped subject of study on extraterritorial jurisdiction,
one that is particularly ripe for an IR approach. An IR approach to anti-corruption
law raises political questions about the extraterritorial enforcement of the FCPA.
Active and vigorous enforcement of the FCPA raises questions, for example,
about the inconsistent application of extraterritoriality across issue areas. Why
is there an intense focus on bribery and corruption, but a reluctance to promote
extraterritorial application of human rights laws, labour standards, environmental
regulations and other areas?100 As the US Supreme Court has been scaling back
extraterritoriality driven by private litigants—in the recent Morrison101 (securities
law) and Kiobel102 (human rights) cases, for example—why have government
agencies enforcing the FCPA been expanding its jurisdictional scope to include
non-US based activities by non-US actors?
Although, as a matter of law, the application of the FCPA across borders
is presented as an issue of jurisdiction, it is fundamentally a matter of state
interests and of state power. Implicating as it does competing claims to
authority and challenges to state sovereignty, extraterritorial jurisdiction in US
anti-corruption enforcement is an important topic for further study. As a key case
of extraterritorial jurisdiction in contemporary global politics, the FCPA—the
subject of wide-ranging and intensive scrutiny in international legal and business
scholarship—deserves greater attention from political scientists.

99. See Danielle Ireland-Piper, “Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: Does the Long Arm of
the Law Undermine the Rule of Law?” (2012) 13:1 Melb J Int’l L 122; Tonya L Putnam,
“Courts Without Borders: Domestic Sources of U.S. Extraterritoriality in the Regulatory
Sphere” (2009) 63:3 Int’l Org 459; Samantha Besson, “The Extraterritoriality of the
European Convention on Human Rights: Why Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and
What Jurisdiction Amounts To” (2012) 25:4 Leiden J Int’l L 857; Arnell, supra note 7.
100. The export of its standards by the United States requires further study. Areas of interest might
include sports anti-doping (through the US Anti-Doping Agency), telecommunications
standards, and others.
101. Supra note 58.
102. Supra note 59.

